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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
'l'HOl\IAS B. PETERSON, COLEEN 
r. PB'l'ERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellmit, 
- vs. -
MIDWEST CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
:\fIDWEST REALTY & FINANCE, 
INC., A. D. COATS AND V AO 
BOWERS, 
Defendants-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10890 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action on an Earnest l\Ioney and Offer 
to Purchase Agreement and also for Fraud in the m-
<luring the Plaintiffs to enter into the agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN 'l'HE LO\VER COURT 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the fraud action for 
faihll'P to state a cause of action was granted and De-
frindant, :Midwest Realty & Finance Inc.'s motion for 
nnnmary judgment on all causes of action in Plaintiffs' 
C'omplaint was granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA:L 
Reversal of the lower court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs were negotiating with the Defendant, A. 
D. Coats, to purchase a house which was to be built 
by the Defendant, Midwest Construction Company in 
the 1966 Utah Parade of Homes Show. 
Plaintiff signed an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement agreeing to purchase the 
house and property at cost. Cost was estimated to be 
between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00. The Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer To Purchase Agreement, provided 
that an exact cost would be furnished prior to con-
struction. The agreement was signed by the Plaintiff, 
and Defendant A. D. Coats, an agent for Defendant, 
.Midwest Realtv and Finance, Inc. (R-~3). 
Construction was commenced, the Defendant did not 
furnish an exact cost, nor did they mention any price 
ehange. 
vVhen construction was nearly completed, the Dt>-
f endants A. D. Coats, and Yao Bowers, induced Plain-
tiffs to move into the new home, and to deed their old 
home and property over to Def Pndant .MidwPst RPalt» 
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and Finance, Inc. This was done allegedly for the pur-
pose of selling the old home for a down payment on the 
new home. At this time no mention was made of a 
price increase in the new home. 
After settling down in the new home, Plaintiffs were 
approached by Defendant Vao Bowers who informed 
them that the price would have to he raised as the 
cost exceeded their estimate. He asked them to sign an 
agreement providing that Plaintiffs would pay full cost. 
On this agreement, there was no estimate of cost. Plain-
tiff refused to sign stating that they had agreed on a 
price between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00. Defendant Vao 
Bowers told them that unless they signed they would 
have to move out of the new home and would forfeit 
their $1,000.00 deposit. The Plaintiffs acquiesced, after 
rao Bowers wrote a limit of $30,000.00 on the subse-
qnrnt agreement. 
Nothing more was said concerning the price until 
some months later when the Plaintiffs were to close the 
transaction. At that time, Defendant, A. D. Coats, told 
them the cost ·was raised to $33,000.00. Plaintiffs refused, 
IH'gotiations failed, and this snit was eommenced. 
Plaintiffs pleaded four causes of action: The first 
was for specific performance on the new property at 
approximately $25,000 to $27,000; the second was in the 
a]tprnative for hn~ach of eon tract: the third was for 
fraud alleging the Defendants knew at the time they 
induced Plaintiffs to sign the Eanwst 1\loney Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase and/or when they induced Plain-
tiffs to move into the new home that they would not 
adhere to their original estimate of between $25,000.00 
and $27,000.00; the fourth cause of action was to require 
Defendants to apply Plaintiffs' equity in their old home 
to purchase price of their new home. Plaintiffs included 
?.! idwest Realty & Finance Inc. as Defondant all(•ging· 
that Midwest Construction Inc. was a mere conduit 
through which l\Iidwest Realty & Finance Inc. concluded 
its business and limited its liability and in the fraud 
action on the grounds that Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats 
were acting as agents for Defendant l\1idwest Realty 
& Finance Inc_ when they committed the fraud. (R-1-G) 
Defendant then made a motion to <lism;ss for failnrP 
to state a cause of action. Tlw motion \Yas deniPd hy 
.Judg<> Rt<>wart 11L HansPn. (R-9) 
At th<> time of the above motion, Defendants also 
made a motion for a more Definite statement alleging 
that Plaintiffs had used the term Defondants \Yithout 
allpo-ino· sp<>cificallv which Defendants had dorn~ \\'hat h h • 
acts and therefore, Defendants could not ans\\'er thl' 
complaint . .Tndg0 Hans011 gnmtPd this motion. (R-11). 
Plantifftl ammendecl their cornplant to spPeifically 
nanw wh'eli Def<>ndants had dmw ,,-Jiat aets. 
Judge Hansen then moved from the Law and Mo-
tion bench in the Third Judicial District and the newly 
appointed Judge, Frank Wilkins, took his place. 
Defendants then made another, identical, motion to 
dismiss the fraud action for failure to state a cause of 
action (R-21). 
Judge Wilkins granted this motion. 
'At the time of the above, Defendant, Midwest Realty 
and Finance Inc. moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that it was not using the Defendant, Midwest 
Construction Company as a conduit through which to 
conduct their business and limit their liability. In sup-
port of this motion, Defendants attached an affidavit 
of Defendant A. D. Coats, which alleged that the two 
corporations were separate. The affidavit showed a 
list of the stockholders and officers of the two corpora-
tions. 
Judge Wilkins granted the motion for summary 
judgment and Plaintiffs' appeal. 
Plaintiffs' had no chance for discovery inasmuch 
as Defendants had never answered Plaintiffs' complaint 
prior to the motion to dismiss. 
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ARGU'.\1EXT 
POINT I 
ALL MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD HA VE BEEN 
DENIED PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED SECTION 78-7-19. 
As may be seen from the record and the facts as they 
are quoted above, Defendants made a motion to ditm1iss 
pursuant to rule 12(b) (6) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cecdure, which was denied by .Judge Stewart Ham;en. 
Judge Hansen was then moved from the Law .Motion 
Bench, 3rd Judicial District, and Judge Frank Wilkins 
took his place. The Defendants, still not having ans-
wered Plaintiffs complaint, made another, identical mo-
tion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(h) (G). 
rtah Code Annotated SPdion 7~-7-19 provi<lPS: 
If an application for an order made to a 
Judge of a Court in whieh tlw action or pn•ct·ed-
ing is pending is refusPd in whole or in part, or 
is g-ranted conditionally, no suhseqm•nt appli<'a-
ti on for the sanw order can lw rnadP to any otlwr 
.J ndg-e PXCPpt of a hip:hPr court. 
Dc•f Pndant contends that tlw faets m the instant 
cas(• falls \\·ithin the purview of Seetion 78-7-19. Tlw 
onl>" Pvents which transpi1·ed hPhn•en the dt•ninl of tlw 
first motion, ancl the raising of tlw spconrl, \\·ns tlw 
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interjection of an a1110ndrd complaint by the Plaintiffs'. 
Tlw amended complaint, in substance, was identical to 
tlw original complaint. 1t differed only in that it spe-
cifically named which Defendants had done what, rather 
nll(•ging g<>nerally the word Defendants, and it also 
nll(•gpd that Defendant, Midwest Realty and Finance, 
Jnr., was conducting business through Midwest Construc-
tion Company. The fraud causes of action at which Df'-
fondants' two 12(b)(6) motions WPre directed Wf'rf' 
suhstantially identical. 
Section 78-7-20 provides that a violation of the above 
~eetions 78-7-19 may be punishable as contempt. At the 
hraring, Plaintiffs counsel raised the statute and asked 
for dismissal on that basis. Although he did not ask 
for rontempt sanctions, he did argue that attorneys fees 
~ltonld hf' paid them for having rnadf' the sf'cond appear-
ance on the same motion. Plaintiff contends that it was 
irnpropPr to bring the two l2(b)6) motions, and that 
thl' low<'r rourt should have dismissed the second motion 
on th<> basis of section 78-7-19. 
POINT II 
THE FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT 
HA VE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO RULE 
12(b)(6). PLAINTIFF'S ALLEATIONS WERE SUF-
FICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN 
FRAUD AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
s 
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Defend-
ants' motion was granted on th0 basis that tlw lllPl'l' 
estimate contained in the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement was not a sufficient repre-
sentation to be the basis of a fraud cause of action. 1'ht> 
fraud cause of action was dismissed as to all four De-
fendants. 
The general rule is that an estimate or opm10n is 
not a sufficient representation to support a cause of 
action in fraud. However, there is a well reeognizcd 
exception to that general rule if the person making tlw 
estimate or the opinion was an ex1wrt and the Plaintiff 
held him out to be such and if the f'stimate or the opinion 
was given by the Defendant with knowledge that it ,,·a;, 
false. See Sime v. Malouf 95 C.A.2d, 82, 212 P. 2d 94:6, 
rt' hearing deni('d, 95 C.A. 2d 82, 213 P. 2d 788; 'l'enrr 
1·. Sussman 120 Colo. 488, 210 P. :.M H!i. ProssPr stat<•s 
thP rule as follows: 
ThP courts lwve clPvdopPd nmrn>rmis PXC'l']l-
tions to thf' rul<• that misn•1H·es<•ntations of opin-
ion an' not a has:s for n·lief. Appan•ntly all 
of tlwsP may lw sm1mwd llll hy saying that tlw)' 
involvP sitnationfi for spc•ci:.i 1 circnrnstanc·l'~: '"·Jiicli 
mak<> it V<'ry n·asonnhl1 • or iirnhahle that tlw 
Plaintiff should acc<'l it tlH' D<'frnclant's op· n ion 
and act npon it and so justify a rPlaxation of tlw 
distrnst which is eonsidN<'<l admirable het11·c·Pll 
bargaining opvonents .... Further, it has h<'Pn 
1Pcoµ;nizP<l V<'l'Y oftPn that tlw <'Xpn•ssion ol' an 
oprn .on m::i.y r·mTy \\'ith :t an irnph·d ass<'rtim1, 
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not only that the speaker knows no fact whjch 
would preclude such an opinion, but that he does 
know facts which justifies his opinion. There is 
a general agreenwnt that such an assertion is to 
be implied when the Defendant holds himself out 
or is understood as having special knowledge of 
the matter which is not available to the Plaintiff, 
so that his opinion becomes in effect an assertion 
summarizing his knowledge. 
Posser,Thc Law of Torts, 566 (2d ed.) (1955) (and 
the cases cited therein). Opinions, estimates, and prom-
ises in. contractual transactions all fall under the same 
rule. Prosser, op. cit. supra. The court in McWilliams 
r. Barnes, 172 Kan. 701, 242 P.2d 1063, stated "The 
general rule applicable here is that a party defrauded in 
the making of a contract who discovers that fraud after 
having partly performed may continue with performance 
and also have an action for damages." In Flemming v. 
Flemming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 233 P.2d 712, 
the Utah court stated that "under some circumstances it 
may be possible to base the deception required in fraud 
upon a state of mind by showing that a promissor has 
a preeonceived determination not to perform his prom-
ise8." 
It is precisely the exception to the general rule 
which the Plaintiffs contend applies to the instant case. 
The>" were dealing with a construction company, a real 
P~tate company, and agents of both. It is their opinion 
that tlwse agPnts <'OUkl qualify as experts at estimating 
10 
the cost of the construction of the home. There is also 
no doubt that the Defendants were in a much better 
position to determine the cost of construction of the 
home than the Plaintiffs. Also, Plaintiffs alleged that 
the Defendants knew that the estimates were false at 
the time they made them. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint, 
under the rule in the cases cited in the previous para-
graph, was sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud 
and the motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
It is always a factual question as to whether a 
person making a misrepresentation, knew at the tinw of 
so making that the representation was false. Plaintiffs 
contend that such an inference may be based on the 
mere fact that the esimate was approximately one-third 
to one-quarter lower than the cost which Defendant sub-
sequently represented as the cost of construction. Re-
gardless \\·liether this inf Pr<~nce is sufficient to support 
a fraud cause of action, Plaintiff should have at least 
heen given a chance to discover facts which n1ight tend 
to prove that A. D. Coats and Yao Bowers were experts 
and whctlwr they knew at the time they represented the 
('stimate to be between $25,000.00 and $27,000.00 that it 
was incorrect and would attempt to raise thP priee to 
$33,000.00; and whether they made the low estimafr 
finly with the inh'nt to indnce the Plaintiffs to sign tlw 
Earnest Thf onr.Y Receipt and Offrr to Purchasr Agr('<'-
ment, and to obtain the $1,000.00 deposit paid by Plain-
tiff. Assuming that the D0fendants did haw such knO\rl-
f-dge ancl intrnt, Plaintiffs would lrnve he(•n d<•framled. 
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I'laint;ffs should have been given a chance to discover 
tlwse facts and the cause of action should not have been 
<lisrnissed under rule 12 (b) (6) URCP. 
Plaintiffs also alleged in their third cause of action 
that it was fraudulent for Defendants to induce Plain-
tiffs to move into the new home and deed their old home 
over to Defendants without telling them that the costs 
had exceeded the original estimate. This point was not 
touched on in Defendant's motion to dismis or argument 
on that motion. Plaintiffs' counsel raised the issue at 
the argument on the motion but the lower court dis-
missed Plaintiffs' third cause of action in its entirety. 
Assuming that the Defendants, Vao Bowers and 
A. D. Coats did not know at the time they made the 
f'stimate of $25,000.00 to $27,000.00 that it was low, 
there may still have been a misrepresentation when they 
induced Plaintiffs to move into the new home without 
telling them that the costs had exceeded the original 
l•stimate Pndoubtedly it would seem that at the timP 
f'Onstruction was nearly completed and Defendants in-
duced Plaintiffs to move, they should have known the 
f'ost of construction had PXCPeded the $27 ,000.00. This 
might he inferred from the fact that shortly therafter, 
thr Defendant, Vao Bower approached Plaintiffs and 
told them that the price had exceeded $27 ,000.00 and 
asked them to sign an agreenwnt to the effect that they 
1rnuld pa)· for eYPr)·thing that D<,f0ndants Pstimated to 
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be the cost. The question is whether the mere silence in 
not telling them that the costs had excPeded the Pstimat!· 
is sufficient to support a fraud cause of action. 
The general rule is that the Defendant has a duty 
of disclosure where he has special knowledge or means 
of knowledge not open to the Plaintiff and is a"·are that 
the Plaintiff is acting under a misapprehension. Prosser 
op. cit. supra at 535 and the cases cite,d therein. The Utah 
court in Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 2G3, :.mo P. 2d G23 
stated that a material nondisclosed or half-truth may 
be the basis for an action for fraud. Tlw rule as statPd 
m 23 Am .• Jr.§78, 85-1: is as follows: 
The principal basic in the la\Y of fraud as it 
related to nondisclosure is that a charge of fraud 
is maintainable where a party knows material 
facts and is under a dnt:•, under tlH~ circum-
stances, to speak and dis<'lose his information, 
hut remains silent. . . . Oenerally speaking, hcm-
ever, in the conduct of various transadions lw-
tween persons involving hrn.;inPss dealings and 
commercial negotiations or otlwr relationships rr-
latin o- to IHOI)ertv contracts rniscPllmwons right:::, 
b • ' ' - . 
there are times and oecasions , .. ·hen the law 1m-
J)OSPS upon a party a duty to f-qwak ratlwr .than 
rpmain silent in res1wct to ('ertain facts \nthlll 
his lmowkdgP and thus to disclose information. 
. . . Among other ways th(' ohligation to c0111-
rnnn icate facts niaY arise is from tlw fact that··· 
tlw party does ~ollldhing- or says sonwthing-, 
whi<'h for \\·ant of cli::-;elosnn• is fah;p an<l clen·11-
tiv<', and is pla<'Nl or p]aC'<'i-' hirn~Plf in n po,.:ition 
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where the silence will convey a false impression . ' or from the fact that a statement or representa-
tion has been made in the bona fide belief that 
it was true, and before it is acted upon the party 
who has made it discovers that it is untrue. 
See also the cases cited in 23 Am. Jur. ~ 79, 856. This 
appPars to be the precise type of case as the instant 
1:ase. Defendants' estimate was apparently low. With-
out saying anything, Defendants induced Plaintiffs to 
move into the new home and deed their old property 
over to Defendants. Plaintiffs did so apparently still 
rPlying on the estimate of $25,000.00 to $27,000.00. A 
question of fact exists as to whether Defendants knew 
whether the estimate was low and still remained silent 
1rhen they induced Plaintiffs to move. Regardless of 
that factual issue, Plaintiffs' complaint is still sufficient 
to state a cause of action in fraud based on nondisclosure. 
The lower court should not have granted Defendants' 
motion under 12(b) (6) URCP. 
It appears that the Plaintiffs' allegations concerning 
llw n•rn·psentation a,nd nondisclosure of the Defendants, 
Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats were sufficient to support 
a cause of action in fraud. Thus, the motion granting the 
lllotion to dismiss against thesP Def Pndants was im-
proper and should be reversed. Since it is claimed that 
tlw Defendants Vao Bowers and A. D. Coats acted as 
agents for the DPfendants, Midwest Construction Com-
pany and Midwest Realty & Finance Company, it was 
al~o imprnp<'r to dismiss tlwsc• D<'frndants from the 
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fraud cause of action. This is true even assmnmg the 
Defendant, Midwest Realty & Finance Company, wa' 
not conducting business through the Defcndan t constrrn·-
tion company and, thus, the corporate veil cannot be 
pierced. They would still be liable under an agency 
theory. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT, MIDWEST REALTY & FINANCE, 
INC., SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN GRANTED SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT AND BEEN DISMISSED FROM 
THE SUIT. AN ISSUE OF FACT WAS RAISED 
AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE CONDUCTING 
BUSINESS THROUGH MIDWEST CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY_ 
Plaintiff's complaint joined l\fidwest R''alty &:. Fi-
nance, Inc., as Defendant in both tlH' fraud and the con-
tract causes of actions. It is Plaintiffs' belief that tht> 
Defendant, :Midwest Construction Company has ven· 
little capital, if any. Plaintiffs furtlwr believe that the 
Defendant construction company transfers the proceeds 
from the sales of homes to the Mid\n'st Realty & Financt', 
Inc. whil<' the liabilitie8 incurred remain with the con-
struction company. It should be pointPd out that Plain-
tiffs' old honw which was to be used as a do\n1-1ia;·went 
on the n<>w home was dePded over to Thi idwP8t Healt.1· 
& Finanr<· In<". Defendant, .:\I id\Y<'St Realty & Financ·P, 
ln<'. oh.i<'dPd to Plaintiffs' allPgations in a uwtion for 
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summary judgment. In support of its motion, it attached 
an affidavit sit,rned by the Defendant, A. D. Coats. This 
affidavit simply listed primary stockholders and officers 
of the two corporations, then went on to state conclusions 
that the two corporations were separate entities. 
Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' motion and 
affidavit simply raised an issue of fact for the jury 
to decide. Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P .2d 
59. Therefore, it was not proper to dismiss the case 
against Midwest Realty & Finance on summary judg-
ment. Ibid; Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual 
Insurar~ce Company, 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264. The 
most recent Utah pronouncement on this issue, is found 
in the opinion by Mr. Justice Ellett, in the case of June 
Singleton v. George V. Alexander, and William J. Greer, 
a ('o-zJartnership, dlNli Carefree Laundry, case number 
10780 (August 15, 1967). In this case Judge Ellett 
stated, ''It will be noted that a summary judgment can 
lw granted only when it is shown that there is no genuine 
i~sne as to any material fact ,and that the moving party 
also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under 
thof.'P facts." 
Th<>re may be an issue as thl' weight to give De-
f('ndants' affidavit, when Plaintiffs did not submit an 
opposing affidavit. The general rule is "There is no 
obligation on Plaintiff to establish hPr <:>ntire case in a 
]ll"t>trial deposition. Summary relief cannot lw imposed 
as trial hy affidavit: f.'nch rPlid is drastic and C'an only 
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be imposed when all facts are admitted which are de-
terminative of duty or right." Champlin vs. Oklahonw 
Furniture Mom,ruff11cturing Company, 269 F.2d 918. Some-
times the rule is stated that an affidavit on summary 
judgment may be used "not to decide any issue of fact 
present, but solely to discover if any real issue of fact 
exists. If there is an issue of fact to be determined, a 
summary judgment cannot be entered." This is also 
the rule in Utah. In the Utah case cited above, Singleton 
vs. Ale:r;ander arnd Greer, dba Carefree Laundry, case 
No. 10780 (August 15, 1967), Judge Ellett stated: "The 
court cannot consider the weight of testimony or the 
credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for sum-
mary judgment. He simply determines that there is no 
disputed issue of any material fact and that as a matter 
of law the party should prevail." 
A qualification on the general rule is shown in 
Dupler vs. Yeates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624. In this 
case the Plaintiffs brought a fraud cause of action alleg-
ing he had relied on several misrepresentations of the 
Defendants. It appeared that previously the same Plain-
tiffs had brought the same cause of action against dif-
ferent Defendants in a "\\Tyoming ca:se. In the Utah case, 
the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the 
gTounds of no reliance. In support thereof, he sub-
mitted certified copies of the ·Wyoming court proceed-
ings, wherein the same Plaintiffs swore they had relied 
on other persons who were the "\Vyoming Defendants. 
The rtah court lwld that whPre tlw moving partiPs 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'1 
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(·yidentuary material is in itself sllfficil'nt and the oppos-
ing party fails to vroffer any evidentiary matter when 
h(' is presumahly in a position to do so, the court should 
lie justified in concluding that no gPnuine issue of fact 
i~ present, nor would be present at the trial. The Utah 
eourt distinguish(~d between the affidavits which are 
sdf-serving in nature, and affidavits containing docu-
mentary evidence which were in effect admissions by 
thr Plaintiffs' against their own interest. 
"In contrast to the self-serving declarations 
usually prof erred by movants for summary judg-
ment, these statements are made by the opposing 
parties themselves . . . PresPnting at most, im-
probable qm•stions of credibility, these documen-
tary statements have a high degree of probative 
value. Furthermore, knowledge of reliance or 
lack of it is within the peculiar province of the 
Plaintiffs. It is not practicable to expect the 
Defendants to present more convincing proof than 
these contradictory assrrtions, hy those who Jrnm\· 
the most concerning the qlwstion of reliance ... 
Furthermore, tlw record contains the agreement 
of August 20, 195G, between the Plaintiffs and 
(the Defendants in the \Y.rnming cases) ... The 
settlement agreement, ... ra!sed tlw inforence 
that the Plaintiffs are fully compPnsatPd for the 
damao-e:-; thc>v now s0ek to n'<'ff\'<'l' frnm the De-a . 
fendants (in tlw Ftah rase )." 
1'hns, as a factual matt(,r the Dupler casr is very dis-
tinguishable from the present case. The statPments and 
the affidavits in the present easP an• s<>lf-spr-,ing. Fur-
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thennore, they pertain to matters peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the Defendant, not the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs could not be expected to controvert Defend-
ants' avennent without a chance for discovery. Further-
more, in the Dupler case, the affidavit pleading satis-
faction by the Plaintiffs was uncontroverted. Therefore, 
Plaintiff submits that the facts in the Dupler case are 
so distinguishable from the present case that it is not 
conrolling. Furthermore, the rule in Dupler only goes 
to determine whether a factual issue exists. It appears 
from the pleadings of Plaintiffa when contrasted with 
the affidavit of the Defendant, that there is a factual 
issue in the present case, and that the affidavit of the 
Defendant was used, contrary to the Dupler rule, to 
determine the factual issue. 
The affidavit of A. D. Coats, apparently made in his 
capacity as officer for both corporations, Defendant, 
Midwest Realty & Finance, lnc., and l\lidwest Construc-
tion Company, does not rule out the possibility that 
the two corporations were acting in concert-or that DP-
f endant, Midwest Construction Company is a conduit 
through which Defendant, l\lidwest Realty & FinancP, 
Inc. conducts business. Sweeping aside the conclusions 
in the affidavit to the effect that the two corporations 
are separate entities, the only factual averments are who 
th<> prineiple stoekholders and officers of the two cor-
porations are. It should be pointed out that it appears 
from the affidavit that a majority shareholder of l\fid-
,\.<'st RPalty & Finance, Tnc .. Rulon .)Pnkins, also O\rns 
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20% of Midwest Construction Company. Furthermore, 
it appears that the officers of Midwest Construction 
Company are also officers of Midwest Realty & Finance, 
Inc. From the service of the pleading, it appears that 
the two corporations share a common office as well as 
agent for service of process. Thus, it does not conclu-
sively appear that Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc., and 
Midwest Construction Company are distinctly separate 
eorporate entities. Plaintiffs would like a chance to 
discover if the assets of the two corporations are as 
interchangeable as their officers. This could be inferred 
from the fact that Plaintiffs old home was deeded over 
to the finance company not the construction company. 
The fact that some of the stockholers in one of the 
corporations are not stockholders in the other corpora-
tion does not necessarily preclude the contention that 
"Midwest Construction Company is a shell or conduit 
through whieh Midwest Realty & Finance conducts busi-
nPss. 
The normal case for piercing the corporate veil, 
would be where the officers of the two corporations are 
identical rather than the shareholders, inasmuch as it 
iH the officers who conduct business of the corporation. 
What is essential, is that the corporations have no inter-
rhange of assets, and one corporation does not use the 
other merely to limit its liability. The general rule as 
stated hy Judge Learned Hand in Kingston Dry Dock 
Company v. the Lakr Champlain Transport Company, 
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31 F.2d 265, is that the determination of whether to pierce 
the corporate veil depends upon common control and 
whether control is exercised to work a fraud. Thus, 
the motion for summary judgment should have been 
denied on the grounds that an issue of fact does remain 
and that the Defendants affidavit did not di spell all 
doubt concerning that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs contend that it was improper to grant 
Defendants motion to dismiss and Defendant, Midwest 
H.ealty and Finance, Inc. 's motion for summary judg-
ent. The motion to dismiss should not have been brought 
inasmuch as the identical motion was made and denied 
by a different Judge at a prior time. Plaintiffs' com-
plaint did state a cause of action in fraud both at the 
time Plaintiffs' entered into the I<:anwst l\loney Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase Agreement with Defendants', and 
at the time Defendants induced Plaintiffs to move into 
the new home. The alleged fraud was perpetrated by De-
frndants Yao Bowers and A. D. Coats. Their fraud 
ma)- be lH'ld actionable against hoth the DPfrnclanb, 
Midwest Realty and F'inance, Inc., and Defendant Mid-
west Construction Company on the basis of agency. 
Furthermore, Defendant :Midwest Realty and Financt> 
Company has not shown conclusively that it is not con-
ducting business through :Midwest Construction Com-
pany, and tlwrefore, its motion for summary judgilll'nt 
l 
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~honld have been denied on the grounds that a factual 
i:-sue still remains to be determined. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Mitsunaga and Ross 
By : Richard Leedy 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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